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ABSTRACT
While much research in political economy points out the benefits of "limited government," political
scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less developed nations by "weak
states," which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and
social challenges from non-state actors. I construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled
by a self-interested ruler, who tries to divert resources for his own consumption, but who can also
invest in socially productive public goods. Both weak and strong states create distortions. When the
state is excessively strong, the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled. When
the state is excessively weak, the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future
and underinvests in public goods. I show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the
economic power of the state (i.e., its ability to raise taxes) and its political power (i.e., its ability to
remain entrenched from the citizens). I also discuss how under certain circumstances, a different type
of equilibrium, which I refer to as "consensually-strong state equilibrium," can emerge whereby the
state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the
proceeds are invested in public goods. The consensually-strong state might best correspond to the








daron@mit.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is now a large and growing literature on the inﬂuence of politics on economic outcomes.1
Much of this literature builds on a central insight of Douglass North’s work: the politically-
determined structure of property rights need not maximize the eﬃciency or the growth potential
of the economy; instead, it strives to maximize the returns to the rulers or politically strong
groups. For example, in his famous book, Structure and Change in Economic History,N o r t h
stresses the “persistent tension between the ownership structure which maximized the rents to
the ruler (and his group) and an eﬃcient system that reduced transaction costs and encouraged
economic growth” (1981, p. 25). While a structure of property rights that limits potential
expropriation encourages investment by the citizens and is generally good for economic growth,
rulers will typically attempt to increase their share of the revenues by taxation or expropriation.
Therefore, this view suggests that “limited government” and constraints on the power of the
state, especially on its power to tax, will generally stimulate growth.
Although there are numerous examples of disastrous economic performance under self-
interested political elites and rulers with little check on their powers, many successful growth
experiences, most notably those in East Asia, have also taken place under the auspices of strong
states. For example, in South Korea General Park ran a highly authoritarian regime, with few
formal checks on state power, and used the resources of the state to help industrialization in
alliance with the large chaebols (as long as they did not pose a threat to his political power).2
Moreover, in contrast to the implications of the simple form of this “limited government”
view, government revenues as a fraction of GDP appear to be higher in richer countries and
in societies that are generally considered to have more “constrained” governments. This is
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, which plot central government revenue as a fraction of GDP
against GDP per capita and the score of constraint on the executive from Polity IV dataset
in the same year (all variables averaged over the 1990s).3 In both cases, a strong increasing
relationship is visible. Although in some of the poorest countries, such as Zaire, the illicit rents
captured by political elites may be larger than the tax revenues, these patterns suggest that
governments in the relatively advanced economies are able to raise higher tax revenues and
play a more important role in the economy.
Consistent with this, a large body of work in political science, especially in the context
of African politics, views the main barrier to economic development not as the strength of
1See, among others, the general discussions in North (1981), Olson (1982), Jones (1981), and North and
Weingast (1989), and the empirical evidence in Knack and Keefer (1995), Barro (1999), Hall and Jones (1999),
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), and the theoretical models in Meltzer and Richard (1981),
Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1997), Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), Besley and Coate (1998), and Dixit (2004).
2See, for example, Huer (1989), Wade (1990) and Kang (2002).
3The data on government tax revenue are from the World Development Indicators (2003), and only include
the central government revenue. The pattern is similar if federal countries are excluded from the sample.
1the state, but as lack of state “capacity,” state power or monopoly over violence. Political
scientists and sociologists have coined the term “weak state” to describe such situations in
which the state has a limited capacity to tax and regulate, and consequently, they argue, to
play a developmental role.4 Migdal (1988, p. 33), for example, remarks: “In parts of the Third
World, the inability of state leaders to achieve predominance in large areas of their countries
has been striking... The ineﬀectiveness of state leaders who have faced impenetrable barriers to
state predominance has stemmed from the nature of the societies they have confronted–from
the resistance posed by chiefs, landlords, bosses, rich peasants, clan leaders,...” Herbst (2000)
suggests that the economic failure of African nations is directly related to their states’ inability
to dominate and extract resources from the rest of society, and contrasts this with the success
in South Korea and Taiwan, where the state has been both politically and economically more
powerful. He argues (p. 115) “the South Korean and Taiwanese states have been able to extract
so many resources from their societies in part because the demands to be constantly vigilant
provoked the state into developing eﬃcient mechanisms for collecting resources and controlling
dissidents groups.” North himself was aware that the problems created by the excessive power
of rulers was only one side of the coin, and argued that the state, with its monopoly of legitimate
violence in society, has an important role to enforce contracts and reduce transaction costs.
The traditional theory of public ﬁnance similarly recognizes the potential role of the state in
public good provision and regulation, though it generally ignores the self-interested motivations
of those controlling the state (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). These considerations suggest
that, perhaps as argued by many political scientists, severe constraints on the ability of the
state to tax, to regulate and to coerce citizens could be detrimental for economic performance.
Nevertheless, an analysis of the trade-oﬀ between the distortions that emerge from the taxation
power of the state run by self-interested elites and the ineﬃciencies due to limits on the state
power has not been undertaken. Nor does there exist a political economy framework to enable
a systematic analysis of the patterns shown in Figures 1 and 2. This paper is an attempt in
this direction.
The main argument of the paper is that both weak and strong states create distortions in the
allocation of resources, and consequently, both excessively weak and excessively strong states
are likely to act as impediments to economic development. While strong states tend to impose
high taxes, discouraging investment and entrepreneurial eﬀort by the citizens, weak states fail
to invest in public goods such as infrastructure, roads, legal rules for contract enforcement,
etc. Weak states underinvest in public goods because self-interested political elites undertake
investments only when they expect future private rewards, and when the state is weak, they
can appropriate fewer rewards in the future. The key for this result is that the state also takes
4See, among others, Migdal (1988), Tilly (1990), Wade (1990), Evans (1995), Reno (1999), Herbst (2000),
La Ferrara and Bates (2001), and Bates (2001).
2actions that are important for the eﬃcient functioning of the economy; this necessitates an
organization of society that provides the right incentives to the self-interested agents controlling
the state.
To develop these ideas more systematically, I consider an economy in which a self-interested
ruler (or social group/elite) controls the state apparatus and can impose taxes on citizens.5
Production is carried out by the citizens, and depends on their investment as well as on the
quality of the infrastructure, which is determined by the public good investments of the ruler.
I ﬁrst illustrate the main argument using a model focusing on the economic power of the state,
parameterized as an economic exit option for the citizens, placing a constraint on taxation.6
If taxes are anticipated to be high, there will be little private investment. However, if taxes
are constrained to be very low, the ruler has no incentive to invest in public goods, since he
will not be able to appropriate (part of) the future revenues generated by these investments.
Intermediate levels of taxes that both encourage investment by the citizens and leave enough
surplus for the ruler to entice him to invest in public goods are necessary for good economic
outcomes. Because both states that are very weak and very strong will lead to poor economic
outcomes, the structure of power has to be “balanced”–at an intermediate level between weak
and strong states–to encourage all parties to undertake investments.
This result has a clear parallel to the insights in the theory of the ﬁrm where the organi-
zation of the ﬁrm determines which groups have power, and via this channel, which groups
will undertake investments.7 For example, a structure of ownership/organization between an
upstream and a downstream producer that gives all the power to the upstream ﬁrm will discour-
age investment by the downstream ﬁrm, whereas one that limits the negotiation power of the
upstream ﬁrm will cause the reverse underinvestment problem. A more balanced structure of
power is necessary for this venture to function. In the same way, a balanced structure of power
in the aggregate is necessary for both the state and the citizens to participate productively in
economic activity.
While the contrast between economically weak and economically strong states is a useful
starting point and highlights the parallel between the results here and the theory of the ﬁrm,
the economic power of the state is not typically constrained by some technological exit option,
5A framework in which policy maximizes the utility of a self-interested ruler subject to constraints imposed
by citizens is in the tradition of principal-agent approaches to politics, for example, Ferejohn (1986) or Persson,
Roland and Tabellini (1997). Moreover, it provides a useful framework for the analysis of policy in many less-
developed countries where political institutions are relatively weak (see Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier, 2003,
for a discussion). Similar qualitative results apply if policies are chosen to maximize a weighted average of the
utilities of the ruler and the citizens subject to the same set of constraints.
6Citizens’ exit options may originate from their ability to shift to informal production, to hide their revenues,
or simply to disobey tax laws. In many less developed countries, raising suﬃcient tax revenue and ensuring
compliance with the tax code are major problems, which sometimes induces governments to use ineﬃcient tariﬀs
to raise revenue.
7See, among others, Williamson (1975), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995).
3but instead originates from and is constrained by its political power. The second part of the
paper shows that the same trade-oﬀs arise when we contrast politically weak and politically
strong states. States are politically weak when rulers can be replaced easily. Politically weak
states will choose low taxes because of the constraints that they face, but will also invest
little in public goods, while politically strong states will tend to choose excessively high taxes.
Consequently, as with the economic power of the state, a balanced distribution of political
power between state and society is also necessary for the economy to function eﬃciently.
In the last part of the paper, I brieﬂy discuss the possibility of a “consensually-strong
state,” which arises in a situation where the state is politically weak (in the sense that rulers
can be replaced easily), but because of a state-society consensus, the government is allowed to
i m p o s eh i g ht a x e sa sl o n ga sas u ﬃcient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods
(see Acemoglu, 2005a, for a more detailed analysis). An equilibrium with a consensually-strong
state best corresponds to the situation in most OECD economies, where the share of taxes in
GDP is high, but much of the proceeds are redistributed back to citizens or invested in public
goods.8 Technically, the diﬀerence between politically weak states and consensually-strong
states corresponds to the diﬀerence between Markov perfect and subgame perfect equilibria
(supported by trigger strategies). An equilibrium with a consensually-strong state emerges
when both the ruler and the citizens deviate from their myopic best responses. This requires
an environment in which there is “trust” in politicians and in the functioning of political
replacement mechanisms, and suﬃcient patience on the side of both parties. The equilibrium
with the consensually-strong state is quite diﬀe r e n ti nn a t u r et h a ne q u i l i b r i aw i t hw e a ka n d
strong states, and leads to richer comparative static results. In particular, a reduction in the
political power of the state increases investment in public goods. Moreover, tax rates in the
consensually-strong state equilibrium may be higher than in the Markov perfect equilibrium,
because in return for the higher spending in public goods, citizens tolerate tax levels that they
would not otherwise accept.
As i g n i ﬁcant conceptual problem in models with self-interested government behavior con-
cerns the distinction between taxation and expropriation. It can be argued that taxation,
which is much more institutionalized and thus predictable, is in essence diﬀerent from expro-
priation, which could be arbitrary and uncertain. While this distinction may be important in
practice, in most theoretical models taxation by the self-interested ruler, like expropriation,
creates a distortionary transfer of resources. How can we then think of the governments of
most developed countries, which, as Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, impose signiﬁcant taxes on
producers, as functioning better than the weaker states in sub-Saharan Africa? The idea of
8This is simply a comparative statement that the degree of control is considerably higher in these societies
than in less developed nations, and does not suggest that voters and citizens can perfectly control the politicians
and bureaucrats in the OECD societies.
4a consensually-strong state suggests a possible interpretation; a consensually-strong state im-
poses higher taxes than weak states, but a large fraction of the proceeds are used for the
provision of public goods. This interpretation reiterates the intuitive notion that in order to
understand whether the state is playing a developmental role in society, we should look not
only at the level of taxation, but also at how the proceeds are spent.
There is considerable research in political economy modeling the impact of various electoral
rules and political institutions on the behavior of politicians. A number of papers analyze the
eﬃciency of public goods provision and government expenditure under a variety of diﬀerent
political institutions.9 In these papers, state-society relations are not the focus, and politicians
act as the agent of the majority or some other politically-powerful group. A diﬀerent literature
in political economy deals with the problem of modeling dictatorial regimes and discusses
various issues related to how the society controls politicians.10 The perspective in this paper
departs from this work by focusing on an environment where the ruler both invests in public
goods and also imposes taxes on citizens to redistribute income to himself. I am not aware
of any other contribution developing the insight that both (economically or politically) weak
and strong states create distortions, and that a balanced structure of power between state and
society is necessary for the eﬃcient functioning of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic environment,
characterizes the (Markov Perfect) equilibrium, and compares the costs and beneﬁts of econom-
ically weak and strong states. Section 3 extends the model to an environment where citizens
can replace the ruler, and discusses the trade-oﬀs introduced by politically weak and politically
strong states. Section 4 analyzes non-Markovian subgame perfect equilibria of the model in
Section 3, and develops the concept of consensually-strong states. Section 5 concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 Description
Consider the following inﬁnite horizon economy. Time is discrete and indexed by t.T h e r ei s
a set of citizens, with mass normalized to 1, and a ruler. All agents discount the future with




βj [ct+j − et+j], (1)
9See, among others, Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Aldrich (1983), Meltzer and Richard (1981), Baron and
Ferejohn (1989), Dixit and Londregan (1995), Myerson (1995), and Lizzeri and Persico (2001).
10See, among others, Grossman (1991), Grossman and Noh (1994), McGuire and Olson (1996), Wintrobe
(1998), Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). Most closely related is the recent
paper by Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004), which discusses optimal constitutional design to balance the costs
of delegation of power to and ex post control of politicians.
5where ct+j is consumption and et+j is investment (eﬀort), and I assume that the ruler incurs
no eﬀort cost.
Each citizen i has access to the following Cobb-Douglas production technology to produce












where At denotes the level of public goods (e.g., the state of the infrastructure, or the degree
of law and contract enforcement between private citizens), at time t.T h el e v e lo fAt will be
determined by the investment of the ruler as described below. The important point captured by
the speciﬁcation in (2) is that a certain degree of state investment in public goods is necessary
for private citizens to be able to function productively, and in fact, investment by the state is
complementary to the investments of the citizens (see Barro, 1990, Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1992, Benhabib, Rustichini and Velasco, 2001, for similar formulations of the role of public
goods in economic growth).
The ruler sets a (linear) tax rate τt on income at time t. Also, each citizen can decide to
hide a fraction zi
t of his output, which is not taxable, but hiding output is costly, so a fraction
δ of it is lost in the process. This formulation with an economic exit option for the citizens
is a convenient, though reduced-form, starting point. In Section 3, I present a model where
citizens’ option to replace the ruler places an equilibrium constraint on taxation.






























where Gt denotes government spending on public goods, and φ>1, so that there are decreasing
returns in the investment technology of the ruler (a greater φ corresponds to greater decreasing
returns).11 The term [(1 − α)φ/α]
1/φ is included as a convenient normalization. In addition,
(5) implies full depreciation of At,w h i c hs i m p l i ﬁes the analysis below. The consumption of
the ruler is whatever is left over from tax revenues after his expenditure and transfers,
cR
t = Tt − Gt.
11If φ =1 , there are constant returns to scale, and the equilibrium is not well deﬁned because the preferences
in (1) are risk neutral. Similar results hold with φ =1and risk-averse preferences, though the analysis is more
involved.
6The timing of events within every period is as follows:
• The economy inherits At from government spending at time t − 1.






• The ruler decides how much to spend on next period’s public goods, Gt, and sets the tax
rate τt.






2.2 The First-Best Allocation










































This expression subtracts both the investment costs of citizens and of the ruler from total
output, which is computed using (2) and (5). Net output is invariant to the distribution of
output and consumption, so taxes do not feature in this expression.
Straightforward diﬀerentiation of NY0 establishes that the ﬁrst-best allocation involves
zi
t =0for all i and t (i.e., no output is hidden) and ei
t = e
fb
t = At. Substituting this into (2)
gives output as: y
fb
t = 1
1−αAt. The optimal level of public goods is obtained as:
At = Afb ≡ β1/(φ−1). (6)
Consequently, the ﬁrst-best allocation is characterized by e
fb
0 = A0, and for all t>0:
e
fb






2.3 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
I now characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of this game. An MPE is deﬁned as












, such that these strategies only depend
on the current (payoﬀ-relevant) state of the economy, At, and on prior actions within the same











The convenient feature of the MPE is that we can determine the equilibrium allocation and
strategies within each period by backward induction, taking the state of the economy from the
previous period, At,a sg i v e n .
12To simplify notation I do not introduce the dependence on the actions already taken in the same stage game








,e t c . ) .
7Let us start with the decisions to hide. Given the structure of the game and the focus on






=1 if τt >δ
∈ [0,1] if τt = δ
=0 if τt <δ
. (7)
Given (7), the optimal tax rate for the ruler is
τt = δ. (8)
Next, investment decisions will maximize the utility of citizens, (1) subject to (3). The Markov
structure implies that this is equivalent to maximizing the current period returns, (1 − τt)yi
t−
ei
t,t h u s :ei
t =( 1− τt)
1/α At. Individual investments are therefore decreasing in the tax rate τt
because higher taxes reduce their net returns, and are increasing in the level of public goods,
At, since this raises the marginal productivity of the producers.
Given the subgame perfect equilibrium tax rate implied by (8), we have
ei
t =( 1− δ)
1/α At. (9)
Substituting (8) and (9) into (4), we obtain equilibrium tax revenue as a function of the level






Finally, the ruler will choose public investment, Gt to maximize his consumption. To
characterize this, it is useful to write the Bellman equation for the discounted net present
value of the ruler, denoted by V (At). This takes the standard form:








t+1 + βV (At+1)
¾
, (11)
which simply follows from writing the discounted payoﬀ of the ruler recursively, after substitut-
ing for his consumption, cR
t , as equal to taxes given by (10) minus his spending on the public
goods from equation (5).
Since, for φ>1, the instantaneous payoﬀ of the ruler is bounded, continuously diﬀerentiable
and concave in A, by standard arguments (e.g., Stokey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989), the value
function V (·) is concave and continuously diﬀerentiable. Hence, the ﬁrst-order condition of





t+1 = βV 0 (At+1), (12)
which links the marginal cost of greater investment in public goods to the greater value that
will follow from this. To make further progress, I use the standard envelope condition, which
8is obtained by diﬀerentiating (11) with respect to At:





The value of greater public goods for the ruler is the additional tax revenue that this will
generate, which is given by the expression in (13).
Combining these conditions, we obtain the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium choice of
the ruler as:
At+1 = A[δ] ≡
³




φ−1 and Gt = G[δ] ≡




which also deﬁnes A[δ] and G[δ], two expressions that will feature prominently in what fol-






β(φ − 1)(1 − δ)
(1−α)/α δ
(1 − β)φ(1 − α)
A[δ]. (15)
The second term in (15) follows since G[δ] in (14) is equal to a fraction 1/φ of tax revenue.
Note that the value of the ruler depends on the current state of public goods, At, which he
inherits from the previous period, and from this point on, the equilibrium involves investment
levels given by (9) and (14).
The following proposition summarizes the main results (proof in the text):14
Proposition 1 There exists a unique MPE where, for all t, τt (At)=δ, G(At) is given by
(14), and, for all i and t, zi (At)=0and ei (At) is given by (9). The equilibrium level of
aggregate output is:











Note that because there is full depreciation of public goods and all agents are risk neutral,
the economy reaches the steady-state level of output in one period. This feature simpliﬁes the
analysis signiﬁcantly, especially in the next two sections.
13Compared to (6), there are three diﬀerences in A[δ]. First, because of the distortion in the eﬀort of citizens,
it includes the term (1 − δ)
1−α
α ; second, because of the self-interested perspective of the ruler, it includes δ;
ﬁnally, because the ruler does not internalize the eﬀort cost incurred by the citizens, it includes α
−1 > 1.I tc a n
be veriﬁed that the ﬁrst two eﬀects always dominate and A[δ] <A
fb.
14In addition, it can be shown that the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
This follows since citizens always take individually rational economic decisions and have no credible punishments
they can use against the ruler.
92.4 Weak States Versus Strong States
The ﬁrst result from the above analysis is a parallel between this model and the literature on
the theory of the ﬁrm. In the incomplete-contract theories of the ﬁrm, various stakeholders,
such as the owner, suppliers, managers and workers, have a tendency to underinvest because
of the ex post bargaining over the output of the ﬁrm, which gives them less than their full
contribution to ﬁrm value.15 The structure of the ﬁrm (in particular, the ownership of assets)
determines the ex post bargaining power of the parties, and hence their ex ante investment
incentives. The optimal, and sometimes the equilibrium, structure of the ﬁrm is the one that
balances these incentives. The current framework gives similar insights on the eﬀects of the
distribution of power on investment incentives in society.
So far, the main parameter that is treated as exogenous is δ, the exit options of citizens.
When δ is high, the state is “economically powerful”–citizens have little recourse against high
rates of taxes. In contrast, when δ is low, the state is “economically weak” (and there is
“limited government”), since it is unable to raise taxes. With this interpretation, we can now
ask whether greater economic strength of the state leads to worse economic outcomes. The
answer is ambiguous, as it can be seen from the fact that when δ =0 , i.e., when the state is
extremely weak, the ruler will choose Gt =0 ,w h i l ew i t hδ =1 , the citizens will choose zero
investments. In both cases, output will be equal to zero.
It is straightforward to determine the level of δ that maximizes output in the society at all
dates after the initial one, i.e., Yt for t>0.I ti sg i v e nb ymaxδ Y [δ],w h e r eY [δ] is given by





If the economic power of the state is greater than δ∗, then the state is too powerful, and taxes
are too high relative to the output-maximizing benchmark. This corresponds to the standard
case that the political economy literature has focused on. In contrast, if the economic power of
the state is less than δ∗, then the state is not powerful enough for there to be suﬃcient rents in
the future to entice the ruler to invest in public goods. This corresponds to the case that the
political science literature has identiﬁed as “the problem of weak states”. Notice an important
diﬀerence from the arguments in the political science literature, however. The problem here
arises because with only limited power to raise taxes in the future, the self-interested ruler has
no interest in increasing the future productive capacity of the economy.
The expression for δ∗ is intuitive. For example, δ∗ is an increasing function of α.T h i si s
because, from the production function (2), a greater α implies that the investment of the ruler
15See, for example, Williamson (1975), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).
16At the initial date t =0 ,w h e r eA0 is inherited from prior investments, δ0 =0would maximize output by
reducing investment distortions. If we were to look for a value of δ such that δt = δ for all t ≥ 0, then this value
would depend on A0 to take advantage of this ﬁrst-period eﬀect.
10is more important relative to the investments of the citizens. Thus the ruler should receive a
greater fraction of the ex post rents to encourage him to invest further. δ∗ is also decreasing
in φ, which corresponds to the degree of decreasing returns in the public good technology.
Greater decreasing returns imply that the investment of the ruler is less sensitive to his ex post
share of the revenues, and thus the optimal division of economic strength in society will give
more weight to the citizens.
The parallel to the theory of the ﬁrm is apparent here: there, the optimal structure of
ownership and control gives ex post bargaining power to the parties that have more important
investments. The same principle applies to the allocation of economic strength as captured
by the parameter δ; greater power for citizens is beneﬁcial when their investments matter
more. When it is the state’s investment that is more important for economic development,
ah i g h e rδ is required (justiﬁed). This might also give a possible interpretation of the divide
between economic and political scientists; perhaps the emphasis of political scientists on the
importance of state capacity and the cost of weak states stems from their belief, not always
shared by economists, that state’s actions are central for economic development.
The above discussion focused on the output-maximizing value of the parameter δ.E q u a l l y
relevant is the level of δ,s a yδr, which will maximize the beginning-of-period payoﬀ to the
ruler. In particular, consider an economy that starts with a level of public goods at A0 and
δ is ﬁxed at δ0 at date t =0 , and the ruler determines the economic power of the state that
will apply from then on, i.e., δt = δr, for all t>0.17 This is the solution to the following
maximization problem:
δr =a r gm a x
δ






β(φ − 1)(1 − δ)
(1−α)/α δ
(1 − β)φ(1 − α)
A[δ],
where I rewrote V ∗ from (15), imposing the assumption that δ is being chosen for all future
periods (and is ﬁxed at δ0 in the initial period). Straightforward maximization gives:
δr = α>δ ∗.
It is not surprising that the level of δ, thus the division of the surplus, preferred by the ruler
is diﬀerent from the output-maximizing one. At δ∗, the output cost of increasing δ a little
beyond δ∗ is second-order, whereas the gain to the ruler is ﬁrst-order.
By analogy, we can also look at the level of δ most preferred by the citizens. Using (1), we











17This could be, for example, by choosing the size of the bureaucracy, but in this case the costs of diverting
agents from production to bureaucracy have to be incorporated; see Appendix B.






t = α(1 −
δ)
1/αAt/(1 − α).A f t e rd a t et =0 , the MPE is followed, so At = A[δ] for t>0 is given by (14).
11with A[δ] given by (14). It is straightforward to show that δc =a r gm a x δ U0 (A0)=α/φ <
δ∗ <δ r, so that citizens prefer an organization of society that gives them a greater share of
the surplus than the one that maximizes output or the one that’s preferred by the ruler. The
intuition is the same as for δ∗ <δ r:a tδ∗, the output loss due to a marginal decline in δ is
second-order, whereas the gain to the citizens is ﬁrst order, so δc <δ ∗.
Finally, we can also investigate what level of δ would maximize net output (total surplus)
when all agents are pursuing their equilibrium strategies. Net output diﬀers from total output,
because the costs of investment by both the citizens and the ruler need to be subtracted (and
it diﬀers from the utility of the citizens because it takes into account the utility of the ruler).
With a similar argument to before, the discounted value of net output starting with A0 is:
NY0 (A0)=
α +( 1− α)δ0
1 − α

















which includes the consumption of both the ruler and the citizens (the α term for the citizens
and the (1 − α)δ for the ruler). Deﬁning δwm =a r g m a x δ NY0 (A0),i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
δc <δ wm <δ r for the same reasons as δc <δ ∗ <δ r (i.e., welfare maximization takes into
account the returns both to citizens and the ruler).19 Summarizing this (proof in the text):20
Proposition 2 Let δ∗, δwm, δr and δc be the values of δ that respectively maximize output,
social welfare, ruler’s utility and citizens’ utility. We then have:
0 <δ c <δ ∗ <δ r < 1 and 0 <δ c <δ wm <δ r < 1.
The main conclusion from this analysis is that when both the state and the citizens make
productive investments, it is no longer true that limiting the rents that accrue to the state is
always good for economic performance. Instead, there needs to be a certain degree of balance
of powers between the state and the citizens. When self-interested rulers expect too few rents
in the future, they have no incentive to invest in public goods. Consequently, excessively weak
states are likely to be as disastrous for economic development as the unchecked power and
expropriation by excessively strong states.
A number of shortcomings of the analysis in this section should be noted at this point. The
ﬁrst is that it relied on exit options of the citizens as the source of their control over the state,
19For example, to see that δ
wm <δ
r, recall that equilibrium public good spending is G[δ] given by (14),
which satisﬁes G
0 [δ = δ








+ φ(1 − α) − 1
i
.
The term in square brackets is positive and its derivative with respect to δ is negative, so G
0 [δ = δ
wm] > 0.
Since G[δ] is concave, we have δ
wm <δ
r.
20In addition, it can be proved that δ
wm Q δ
∗ depending on whether (1 − α) Q 1/φ.
12whereas, in practice, political controls may be more important. The second is that changes
in the power of the state aﬀect taxes and investments in public goods in the same direction;
weak states do not tax their citizens, but neither do they invest in public goods. Relatedly, the
pattern in Figure 2 suggests that more constrained governments collect higher tax revenues,
which is also diﬃcult to reconcile with the model here. These issues will be discussed in the
next two sections.
3P o l i t i c a l P o w e r
So far, the analysis focused on the distribution of economic power in the economy, and modeled
the main constraint on the taxation power of the state as the technological exit options of the
citizens. Although exit options, including access to the informal sector and tax evasion, place
limits on the level of taxes that the state can impose, the taxation capability of the state and
the constraints on it often emanate from its “political power”. The political power of the state
depends on how easily citizens can replace a ruler who is pursuing policies detrimental to their
interests. In this section, I extend the model to allow for citizens to replace the ruler at the
beginning of each period with a new identical ruler. The costs of replacing the ruler determine
the political power of the state. The main result of this section is to show that the same trade-
oﬀs that were highlighted in the previous section also apply to the political power of the state.
In particular, both excessively strong and weak states lead to poor economic performance.
I modify the baseline model of Section 2 as follows: now there is a large set of identical
potential rulers, and citizens decide whether to replace the current ruler, denoted by Rt ∈
{0,1}. After replacement, citizens can reclaim part of the tax revenue and redistribute it to
themselves as a lump sum transfer, St. At the time of replacement, the public goods spending,
Gt, is already committed and ruler replacement does not aﬀect next period’s level of public
goods. Instead, citizens take back a fraction η ∈ (0,1] of the tax revenue, Tt,a n dt h er e s to f
the revenue is lost in the process, so the consumption of the ruler is equal to zero, and the
ruler is also assumed to receive zero continuation utility after replacement.21 Replacement is
costly, however, and at time t citizens face a cost of replacing the current ruler with a new
ruler equal to θtAt,w h e r eθt is a nonnegative random variable with a continuous distribution
function ˜ Fλ,w i t h( ﬁnite) density ˜ fλ. This is a tractable formulation for introducing stochastic
replacements of the ruler along the equilibrium path. The cost is multiplied by At to ensure
that the level of public goods does not have a mechanical eﬀect on replacement. Finally, I
21The results are similar if, after losing power, rulers work as citizen-producers rather than obtain zero utility,
and/or if the ruler’s consumption, when replaced, is equal to c
R
t =( 1− η)Tt − Gt rather than zero. Both of
these assumptions are adopted to simplify the analysis and the exposition. The second assumption implies that
we should think of η<1/φ, so that (in steady state), what citizens take is less than government spending on
public goods (see equation (14) in the previous section).
13impose:
˜ fλ (x)
1 − ˜ Fλ (x)
is nondecreasing in x and ˜ Fλ (0) < 1. (A1)
The ﬁrst part is the standard monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) assumption, which is also
equivalent to 1 − ˜ Fλ being log concave (see Burdett, 1979), and the second part rules out the
degenerate case where there is always replacement.
The timing of events in this endogenous replacement game can be summarized as:
• The economy inherits At from government spending at time t − 1.






• The ruler commits the spending on next period’s public goods, Gt, and sets the tax rate
τt.






• θt is realized.
• Citizens choose Rt.I fRt =1 , the current ruler is replaced and a fraction η of the tax
revenue is redistributed to the citizens as a lump-sum subsidy St = ηTt.
I assume that although citizens make their economic decisions independently, the political
decision, the choice of Rt, is made to maximize group utility.22












, such that these strategies only depend on the current state of the
economy, At, and on prior actions within the same date according to the timing of events above.











In addition, it is convenient to focus on a steady-state MPE where At = At+  for all   ≥ 0.
To simplify the analysis, I also assume that
δ ∈ (δ∗,α), (A2)
where δ∗ is given by (17). This assumption ensures that taxes are always less than the value
δr = α that maximizes ruler utility (see Section 2.4), and also allows for taxes that are poten-
tially higher than the output-maximizing level, δ∗.
22This is without loss of any generality; since all citizens have identical preferences regarding replacement, this
outcome would result from various ways of solving the political collective action problem among the citizens.
For example, if each citizen votes between Rt =0and Rt =1to maximize their own utility, voting for the
choice that maximizes group utility is a weakly dominant strategy for each.
14Citizens’ hiding decisions are still given by the privately optimal rule, (7). Moreover, in





Intuitively, in the MPE replacing the ruler has no future costs or beneﬁts (since all future rulers
condition their strategies only on the payoﬀ-relevant state variable, At), so it is in the citizens’
interest to replace the ruler when the immediate beneﬁt, ηTt, exceeds the cost, θtAt.T h e
important substantive implication of (18) is that greater taxes will lead to a higher likelihood
of ruler replacement.
Condition (18) immediately implies that the probability that the ruler will be replaced is






so that Tt = T (τt)At. Let us also parameterize the distribution function as ˜ Fλ (x)=λF (x/η)
for some continuous distribution function F (x) with (ﬁnite) density f (x) for all x>0,
which will be useful both to simplify notation and for comparative static exercises below.23
This assumption implies that the probability that the ruler will be replaced is λF (Tt/At)=
λF (T (τt)). The monotone likelihood ratio property of ˜ Fλ in (A1) clearly carries over to F.
The relevant value function for the ruler can then be written as:
V (At)= m a x
τt∈[0,δ],At+1
½













Now the ruler’s maximization problem involves two choices, τt and At+1,s i n c et a x e sa r en o
longer automatically equal to the maximum, δ. In this choice, the ruler takes into account
that a higher tax rate will increase the probability of replacement. The ﬁrst-order condition













≥ 0 and τt ≤ δ, (21)
with complementary slackness,24 where recall that Gt = αA
φ
t+1/(φ(1 − α)). Assumption A2
implies that τ<α ,s o∂T (τt)/∂τt > 0 and in an interior equilibrium the term in square
brackets has to be equal to zero. In other words, the additional expected revenue brought
23More formally, this should be ˜ Fλ (x)=m i n{λF (x/η),1}, but I suppress the min to simplify notation.
This parameterization can be loosely interpreted as follows: with probability 1 − λ, θ = ∞,a n dr e p l a c i n g
the ruler is impossible (inﬁnitely costly), while with probability λ, the cost of replacing the ruler is drawn
from the distribution F (though, contrary to what is implied by this analogy, λ can be greater than 1). This
interpretation will be particularly useful in the next section.
24I ignore the possibility τt =0 , since this can never be the case in a steady state equilibrium.
15by higher taxes (the ﬁrst term in square brackets) must be balanced by higher probability of
losing these taxes and the continuation value (the second term in square brackets).
Assuming that V (At+1) is diﬀerentiable in At+1,t h eﬁrst-order condition for At+1 is still
given by (12) in Section 2 (since the term (1 − λF (T (τt))) cancels from both sides).25 The
expression for V 0 (At+1) again follows from the envelope condition,
V 0 (At+1)=( 1− λF (T (τt+1)))T (τt+1). (22)
It only diﬀers from the corresponding condition in Section 2, (13), because with probability
λF (T (τt+1)), the ruler will be replaced and will not enjoy the increase in future tax revenues.
Using this, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to At+1 implies that in an interior equi-
librium:
At+1 = A[τt+1] ≡
³





The optimal value of At+1 for the ruler depends on τt+1 since, from the envelope condition,
(22), the beneﬁts from a higher level of public good are related to future taxes.
To make further progress, let us focus on the steady state equilibrium where τt+  = τ∗ for
all   ≥ 0 (which follows since in steady state At = At+ ). Hence
A[τ∗] ≡
³





In addition, we have G[τ∗]=βT (τt)A[τ∗]/φ. Therefore, the value function for the ruler in
steady state can be written as V (A[τ∗]) = (1 − λF (T (τ∗)))v[τ∗]A[τ∗],w h e r e
v[τ∗] ≡ T (τ∗)+
(φ − 1)
φ
β (1 − λF (T (τ∗)))T (τ∗)
(1 − β (1 − λF (T (τ∗))))
. (24)
Now using (20), (21), (24), and the fact that in steady state τt+  = τ∗ for all   ≥ 0,w eo b t a i n
the following equation for an interior steady-state equilibrium tax rate, τ∗:
λf (T (τ∗))v[τ∗] − (1 − λF (T (τ∗))) = 0. (25)
This equation is intuitive. The ﬁrst term is the cost of a unit increase in T (τ). This increase
reduces the probability of staying in power by an amount equal to λf (T (τ)). This is multiplied
by the (normalized) value of staying power, v[τ∗],( s i n c ev[τ∗]=T (τ∗) − G(A[τ∗])/A [τ∗]+
βV (A[τ∗])/A [τ∗]). The second term is the beneﬁt of a unit increase in tax revenue, which
the ruler receives with probability 1−λF (T (τ)).N o t et h a tτ∗ =0can never be a solution to
this equation, since βv[0] = T (0) = 0. Therefore, there will be an interior solution as long as
λf (T (δ))v[δ] > 1 − λF (T (δ)). (26)
25In general, V (At) is not always diﬀerentiable because the maximization problem in (20) is not necessarily
jointly concave in At+1 and τt+1, and may have multiple solutions. Assumption A3 below ensures uniqueness
and diﬀerentiability.
16If, on the other hand, (26) does not hold, then the equilibrium will be a corner solution with
τ = δ and A[τ = δ] This establishes the existence of an MPE. To establish uniqueness, we





(1 − λF (0))
¶2
− (φ − 1)
β
φ
(1 − λF (0)) > 0. (A3)
This assumption requires β (1 − λF (0)) not to be too large, and can be satisﬁed either if β is
not too close to 1 or if λF (0) is not equal to zero. Intuitively, if β (1 − λF (τ∗)) is close to 1,
v[τ∗] can be very large, creating a non-monotonicity in (25). Assumption (A3) is suﬃcient to
ensure that this is not the case, so the left-hand side of (25) is everywhere increasing and there
is a unique equilibrium (see the proof of Proposition 3). This observation, combined with the
MLR assumption, (A1), also leads to unambiguous comparative static results:
Proposition 3 Suppose (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold. Then, in the endogenous replacement
game of this section, there exists a unique steady-state MPE.
• In this equilibrium, if (26) does not hold all rulers set τ = δ and A[τ = δ]. If (26) holds,
then they set τ∗ <δgiven by (25), and A[τ∗] g i v e nb y( 2 3 ) . C i t i z e n sr e p l a c ear u l e r
whenever θt <η T (τ∗) where T (·) is given by (19).
• In this equilibrium, ∂τ∗/∂λ ≤ 0, ∂ ˜ A/∂λ ≤ 0, ∂τ∗/∂δ ≥ 0 and ∂ ˜ A/∂δ ≥ 0.
• There also exists λ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that output is maximized when λ = λ∗.
Proof: The analysis above establishes that the steady-state MPE tax rate, τ∗,i sc h a r a c -
terized by (25), or by
F (τ∗) ≡
λf (T (τ∗))
1 − λF (T (τ∗))
v[τ∗] − 1=0 ,
as long as (26) is satisﬁed, and by τ∗ = δ otherwise. To establish existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium, ﬁrst suppose (26) holds. Then note that F (τ∗ =0 )=−1 and given that (26)
holds, F (τ∗ = δ) > 0.S i n c eF (τ∗) is continuous in τ∗, an interior solution exists. To prove
that this solution is unique, it is suﬃcient to show that F (τ∗) is increasing in τ∗ whenever
F (τ∗)=0(which implies that τ∗ must be unique from the mean value theorem). Note that:
(1) since τ∗ <αfrom (A2), T (τ∗) is increasing in τ∗; (2) given the MLR assumption, (A1),
λf (T (τ∗))/(1 − λF (T (τ∗))) is nondecreasing in T (τ∗).T h e r e f o r e , i f v[τ∗] is indecreasing
in T (τ∗), F (τ∗) would be increasing in τ∗ whenever F (τ∗)=0 . To obtain this last step, note




(1 − λF (T (τ∗)))




λf (T (τ∗))T (τ∗)
[1 − β (1 − λF (T (τ∗)))]
2.
17Then (25) implies that λf (T (τ∗)) = (1 − λF (T (τ∗)))/v [τ∗]. Substituting this in the pre-
ceding expression, using (24) and simplifying, we have:
v0 [τ∗]=
1





(1 − λF (T (τ∗))) − β
φ − 1
φ
1 − λF (T (τ∗))
1 −
β
φ (1 − λF (T (τ∗)))
#
Assumption (A3) ensures that v0 [τ∗] ≥ 0 since F (T (τ∗)) ≥ F (0). This establishes existence
and uniqueness for the case where (26) holds. When (26) does not hold, τ∗ = δ is the unique
equilibrium.
The result that ∂τ∗/∂λ ≤ 0 follows from the implicit function theorem, since F (τ∗) is
nondecreasing in τ∗ given MLR and is also increasing in λ. From (23), A[τ∗] is a decreasing
function of λ and Assumption (A2) also implies that it is a decreasing function of τ∗.S i n c e
∂τ∗/∂λ ≤ 0, this implies that ∂A[τ∗]/∂λ ≤ 0. Finally, when τ∗ <δ , δ has no eﬀect on
equilibrium values, and when τ∗ = δ, ∂τ∗/∂δ ≥ 0 and ∂A[τ∗]/∂δ ≥ 0.
Finally, aggregate output, Y [τ∗], is given by equation (16), with A[τ∗] replacing A[δ].
We have that τ∗ and A[τ∗], and hence (16), are continuous in λ.A s λ →∞ , τ∗ → 0,a n d
limτ∗→0 Y [τ∗]=0 . Moreover, as λ → 0, τ∗ → δ>δ ∗ (recall that δ ∈ (δ∗,α) from (A2)),
so Y [τ∗] is decreasing in the neighborhood of τ∗ = δ. This, combined with the continuity of
Y [τ∗] in λ, establishes that aggregate output is maximized at some λ = λ∗ ∈ (0,∞). QED
The most important result in this proposition is that, similar to the analysis of the economic
power of the state in the previous section, there is an optimal level of the political power of
the state. Intuitively, when λ<λ ∗, the state is excessively powerful, citizens expect high taxes
and choose very low levels of investment (eﬀort). When λ>λ ∗, the state is excessively weak
and there is the reverse holdup problem; high taxes will encourage citizens to replace the ruler,
and anticipating this, the ruler has little incentive to invest in public goods, because he will
not be able to recoup the costs with future revenues. Therefore, this proposition reiterates
the main insight from the previous section: there needs to be a balanced distribution of (both
economic and political) power between the state and the citizens to encourage both parties to
make investments in the productive resources of the society.
The proposition also establishes the equilibrium tax rate and public good spending are
decreasing in λ (and increasing in δ). These are intuitive. A lower value of λ corresponds to a
situation in which politicians are more entrenched and more costly to replace, thus politically
more powerful. Since taxes are constrained by the political power of the citizens (i.e., their
power to replace the ruler when taxes are high), a lower λ implies that the ruler will impose
higher taxes and will be willing to invest more in public goods. Consequently, this model, like
the one in the previous section, implies that the (economic or political) power of the state
aﬀects taxes and investment in the public good in the same direction, and it also suggests that
it should be less constrained governments that collect higher taxes and invest more in public
18goods. We will next see that when non-Markovian subgame perfect equilibria are considered,
these implications change signiﬁcantly.
4 Consensually-Strong States
The analysis so far focused on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPEs), where the repeated nature
of the game between the ruler and the citizens is not exploited. In this framework, weak states
are costly because rulers are unable to impose high taxes and do not have suﬃcient incentives
to invest in public goods. However, when the state is politically weak, in the sense that the
politician in power can be replaced easily, a consensus between state and society can develop
whereby citizens will tolerate high taxes (and will not replace the government because of these
high taxes) as long as a suﬃcient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods. I
refer to this as a “consensually-strong state,” and in this section, I brieﬂy investigate how
a consensually-strong state can arise as a subgame perfect equilibrium in the game of the
previous section.
An analysis of consensually-strong states is interesting not only to relax the restriction
to MPE (which may not be warranted given the repeated interaction between the ruler and
the citizens), but also because the concept of a consensually-strong state might be useful in
providing us with a simple framework to think about state-society relations in many developed
countries. As suggested by Figures 1 and 2, though they appear to be politically constrained,
governments in these societies impose relatively high taxes, and then spend a high fraction of
the proceeds on public goods. Such an outcome appears diﬃcult in the models of the previous
two sections; if δ is high or λ is low, the government imposes high taxes, but consumes a
high fraction of the proceeds. However, in the “consensually-strong state” equilibrium of this
section, the pattern with high taxes and relatively high investments in public goods will emerge
as the equilibrium when both δ and λ are high (also when the discount factor β is high).
A subgame perfect equilibrium is a set of strategies that are best responses to each other
given all histories, and the on-the-equilibrium-path behavior in this equilibrium can be de-










. The purpose of this
section is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, but
to have a ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h et h ed i ﬀerent implications that arise once we consider non-Markovian
strategies. I will therefore focus on the “consensually-strong state” equilibrium, which is de-
ﬁned as a stationary strategy proﬁle maximizing the steady-state utility of the citizens.26 Since
all rulers are ex ante identical, the best such equilibrium should keep the ruler in power as long
as he follows the implicitly-agreed strategy. Let us think of this equilibrium as a policy vector
(τ, ˜ A) such that as long as the ruler follows this policy vector, he will never be replaced, and
26The major simpliﬁcation here is to focus on steady states rather than start at some arbitrary level of public
good, A0, and then trace the law of motion of At.
19his continuation value when he deviates is derived from a credible punishment strategy of the
citizens.
To simplify the analysis further, I ﬁrst discuss the case where ˜ Fλ = ˜ F∗
λ with ˜ F∗
λ taking the
following simple form: with probability 1 − λ, θ = ∞, and with probability λ, θ =0 .T h i s
implies that with probability 1 − λ, citizens cannot replace the ruler, and with probability
λ, they can do so without any costs. Finally, all of the proofs relevant for this section are
contained in Appendix A.
4.1 Analysis When ˜ Fλ = ˜ F∗
λ
Let V c(˜ τ, ˜ A | A) be the value of the ruler in such an equilibrium where the current state is A,
and all future taxes and public good investments are given by (˜ τ, ˜ A).W et h e nh a v e :
V c(˜ τ, ˜ A | A)=












(1 − ˜ τ)
1−α
α ˜ τ ˜ A
1 − α
. (27)
Here the superscript c denotes “cooperation,” and the form of this expression immediately fol-
lows from (15), incorporating the fact that future policies are (˜ τ, ˜ A) and there is no replacement
of the ruler.
In contrast, if the ruler decides to deviate from the implicitly-agreed policy (˜ τ, ˜ A),h i s
continuation value will depend on the punishment strategies he expects. Recall that with
probability 1−λ, citizens are unable to replace the ruler (θ = ∞), whereas with probability λ,
they can replace the ruler without any cost. Since citizens cannot coordinate their economic
decisions, replacing the ruler with probability λ a n dt h e np l a y i n gt h eM P Es t r a t e g i e si st h e
worst (credible) punishment.27 Anticipating replacement with this probability, the problem
of the ruler is similar to that analyzed in Section 2. In particular, he will always tax at the
maximum rate, δ, and choose the level of investment in public goods consistent with his own
objectives (since following a deviation, the ruler is replaced with probability λ irrespective of
the tax rate, he sets the highest possible tax rate, δ). Thus his deviation value as a function
of the current state A and the tax expectation of the citizens, ˜ τ,28 is given by
















+ β(1 − λ)˜ V d(Ad)
)
. (28)
This expression takes into account that when the ruler deviates, he takes advantage of the fact
that citizens invested expecting a tax rate of ˜ τ<δ , and then taxes them at the rate δ. Sub-
sequently, he invests an amount Ad in the public good, consistent with his own maximization
27Worse punishments could include citizens reducing their investments below the privately optimal level, thus
reducing the ruler’s future revenues. Such punishments are not possible/credible, however, given the assumption
that individuals take the privately optimal economic decisions.
28Expectations matter because citizens choose their investments as a function of the promised tax rate, τ.
20problem, and receives the MPE continuation value. An analysis similar to that in Section 2
shows that this value is
˜ V d(A)=





β(1 − λ)2(φ − 1)(1 − δ)
1−α
α δA[δ | λ]
(1 − β(1 − λ))(1 − α)φ
,
with A[δ | λ] deﬁned by:
A[δ | λ] ≡
³





Therefore, the deviation value of the ruler is:
V d (A | ˜ τ)=





β(1 − λ)2(φ − 1)(1 − δ)
1−α
α δA[δ | λ]
(1 − β(1 − λ))(1 − α)φ
. (30)
In the consensually-strong state equilibrium, the ruler is expected to follow the agreed pol-
icy, (˜ τ, ˜ A), starting from a level of public goods equal to ˜ A. Therefore, the ruler incentive
compatibility constraint is:
V c(˜ τ, ˜ A | ˜ A) ≥ V d
³
˜ A | ˜ τ
´
. (31)
This incentive compatibility constraint requires that the ruler prefers the equilibrium strategy
to deviating and taxing at the highest possible rate for his own consumption. It must also
be in the interest of the citizens not to replace the ruler pursuing the implicitly-agreed policy.
When they do so, the analysis in Section 2 implies that their payoﬀ is given by:
Uc
³










(1 − ˜ τ)1/α ˜ A. (32)
In contrast, if they deviate, the society reverts back to the MPE (because all future rulers will
expect the citizens to play the MPE strategies), where a ruler is replaced with probability λ
and taxes at the maximal rate, δ (investing in A only to increase future tax revenues). The
payoﬀ to the citizens if they deviate (in some period in which θ =0 )i sg i v e nb y :
Ud
³





(1 − ˜ τ)(1−α)/α (α(1 − ˜ τ)+η˜ τ)A + (33)
β
1 − α





(1 − δ)(1−α)/α (α(1 − δ)+λδ)A[δ | λ].
To understand this expression, note that when they deviate, the citizens obtain a fraction η
of the tax revenue, T (˜ τ), which introduces an additional (1 − ˜ τ)(1−α)/αη˜ τA in the current
period. Moreover, at the time of deviation, the ruler has already undertaken the investment in
public good, ˜ A, so the MPE level of public goods, A[δ | λ], applies only from two periods on.
Citizens’ incentive compatibility is satisﬁed when they prefer to maintain a ruler who follows
the agreed policy, i.e., when
Uc
³




˜ τ, ˜ A | ˜ A
´
. (34)
21The consensually-strong state (the best steady-state subgame perfect equilibrium from the






˜ τ, ˜ A | ˜ A
´
(35)
subject to (31) and (34).
To characterize the equilibrium, I start with a solution in which (34) is slack, and then
show that for suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hv a l u e so fβ, in particular for β ≥ β∗, (34) will indeed be slack.
Therefore, the problem is to maximize (35) subject to (31). It is straightforward to see that the
constraint (31) has to be binding (otherwise, taxes can be reduced to increase citizen utility)
and that ˜ A =0or ˜ τ =0cannot be solutions (since in the former case citizens would receive zero
utility and in the latter case, given ˜ A>0, (31) would be violated). Since both the objective
function (35) and the boundary of (31) are continuously diﬀerentiable in (˜ τ, ˜ A),t h eﬁrst-order
conditions together with a boundary condition for ˜ τ ≤ δ are necessary for an equilibrium.29
The ﬁrst-order conditions are given in Appendix A, and boil down to two conditions, which
are shown diagrammatically in Figure 3:
(1 − ˜ τ)
1−α
α ˜ τ ˜ A








(1 − λ)(1 − ˜ τ)
1−α
α δ ˜ A
1 − α
−
β(1 − λ)2(φ − 1)(1 − δ)
1−α
α δA[δ | λ]
(1 − β(1 − λ))φ(1 − α)
=0 ,
which represents the incentive compatibility constraint of the ruler, and the condition
(1 − ˜ τ)
1−α
α (1 − (1 − β)(1− λ)δ) ≥ ˜ Aφ−1, (37)
and ˜ τ ≤ δ with complementary slackness. This condition captures the trade-oﬀ between taxes
and public good investments from the citizens’ viewpoint.
Equation (37), when holding as equality, deﬁnes the locus of combinations of (˜ τ, ˜ A) consis-
tent with the optimal trade-oﬀ for the citizens when ˜ τ<δ .S i n c eφ>1, this locus is downward
sloping, drawn as the thick broken line in Figure 3. Intuitively, from citizens’ viewpoint, high
levels of public goods should be associated with low levels of taxes. These combinations also
have to satisfy (36), which is drawn an upward-sloping curve; if the ruler is required to invest
more in public goods, taxes also need to increase to ensure incentive compatibility. Appendix
A shows that this locus is indeed upward sloping, and also establishes that as long as
φ − 1 ≥ 1 − α, (A4)
an increase in λ, which corresponds to the state becoming politically weaker, leads to higher
investments in public good (i.e., ∂ ˜ A/∂λ > 0).
29Appendix A also shows that, given Assumption (A4), these ﬁrst-order conditions characterize a maximum,
thus an equilibrium.
22Finally, we need to ensure that when policy (˜ τ, ˜ A) is followed, the incentive compatibility
constraint of the citizens, (34), is satisﬁed. It can be proved that this will be the case as long
as β ≥ β∗ ≡
¡√
1+4 λ − 1
¢
/2λ<1 (proof in Appendix A).
Proposition 4 Consider the endogenous replacement game of Section 3, and suppose that
˜ Fλ = ˜ F∗
λ (i.e., θ = ∞ with probability 1 − λ,a n dθ =0with probability λ), Assumptions A2
and A4 hold, and let β∗ ≡
¡√
1+4 λ − 1
¢
/2λ. Then for all β ≥ β∗, a consensually-strong state
equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, the ruler always follows the policy (˜ τ, ˜ A), and is never
replaced, and taxes are lower than in the MPE, i.e., ˜ τ ≤ δ. Moreover, as long as ˜ τ<δ , we
have that when economic or political power of the state increases, investments in public goods
decrease, i.e., ∂ ˜ A/∂λ > 0 and ∂ ˜ A/∂δ < 0.
Therefore, the results with the consensually-strong state are very diﬀerent from those in the
previous two sections; in particular, as the economic or political power of the state decreases,
investments in public goods increase, while the implications for the equilibrium tax rate are
ambiguous. For example, when the state becomes politically less powerful (i.e., λ increases),
the incentive compatibility constraint of the ruler, (36) shifts down as shown by the shift
to the dashed curve in Figure 3. Simultaneously, the curve for (37) shifts out (again to
the dashed curve). Consequently, while ˜ A increases, the implications for ˜ τ are ambiguous.
Intuitively, when it becomes easier to control the ruler (because deviating from the agreed
policy becomes less proﬁtable for him), citizens demand greater investments in public goods,
which may necessitate greater taxes to cover the public expenditures and the rents that the
ruler needs to be paid to satisfy his incentive compatibility constraint (see Acemoglu, 2005a).
Similar results obtain in response to changes in the economic power of the state, δ. Interestingly,
however, the comparative static with respect to δ need not hold when ˜ τ = δ;i nt h i sc a s e ,a
decline in δ forces a lower tax rate, and investments in public goods may also need to decrease
to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint of the ruler.
These results enable us to envisage a situation similar to those in OECD countries, where
the government imposes high taxes but also invests a high fraction of the proceeds in public
goods. This would correspond to a high value of δ (otherwise, ˜ τ = δ and taxes would be con-
strained to be low) and also a high value of λ (otherwise, the incentive compatibility constraint
of the ruler would be excessively tight, and only low levels of investment in public goods can
be supported). Naturally, for all of these outcomes the society also needs to coordinate on the
consensually-strong state equilibrium, and the discount factor, β, needs to be suﬃciently high.
4.2 Analysis for General ˜ Fλ
T h ea n a l y s i ss of a rw a ss i m p l i ﬁed with the assumption that ˜ Fλ = ˜ F∗
λ. Now consider a more
general ˜ Fλ, again parameterized as ˜ Fλ (x/η)=λF (x) and satisfying the MLR Assumption A1
23above. Let us continue to look for an equilibrium in which along the equilibrium path the ruler
is not replaced, and in which, following a deviation by either party, the equilibrium reverts to
the MPE path.30 In this case, the basic equations change in an intuitive way. While equations
(27) and (32) still give the payoﬀ to the ruler and the citizens from cooperation, the deviation
payoﬀ to the ruler now changes from (30) to
V d (A | ˜ τ)=( 1 −λF (T (ˆ τ (A))))
(
(1 − ˜ τ)
1−α
α ˆ τ (A)A
1 − α
+
β(1 − λF (T (¯ τ)))(φ − 1)(1 − ¯ τ)
1−α
α A[¯ τ]




where ˆ τ (A) is the tax rate that the ruler ﬁnds optimal upon deviation given the value of
the state variable at A,a n dλF (T (ˆ τ (A))) is the probability of replacement at this tax rate
(this follows from the analysis in Section 3, since after a deviation, the economy switches to the
MPE). In addition, ¯ τ, A[¯ τ] and λF (T (¯ τ)) are the optimal continuation tax rate, investment in
public goods by the ruler, and the corresponding replacement probability following a deviation.





and A[¯ τ] ≡
³





Since ˆ τ (A) is optimally chosen by the ruler, it satisﬁes a condition similar to (25),
λf (T (ˆ τ (A))) ¯ v(¯ τ,A) − (1 − λF (T (ˆ τ (A)))) = 0, (39)
where ¯ v(¯ τ,A) is the expression in curly brackets in (38) divided by A.
A similar reasoning to before implies that the consensually-strong state equilibrium is given





˜ τ, ˜ A | ˜ A
´
subject to (31) and (34), with the only diﬀerence being that in these constraints V d
³




˜ τ, ˜ A | ˜ A
´
are now diﬀerent. The ﬁrst one is given by (38), while the second one is
developed in Appendix A. The rest of the analysis is similar. Appendix A provides the details
of the analysis and proves the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Consider the endogenous replacement game of Section 3, and suppose that
Assumptions A1, A2 and A4 hold. Then there exists β∗∗ < 1 such that for β ≥ β∗∗,a
consensually-strong state equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, the ruler always follows the
policy (˜ τ, ˜ A), and is never replaced. Moreover, as long as ˜ τ<δ , we have that when economic
or political power of the state increases, investments in public goods decrease, i.e., ∂ ˜ A/∂λ > 0
and ∂ ˜ A/∂δ < 0.
30When ˜ Fλ = ˜ F
∗
λ, the MPE is the most severe credible punishment. This is typically no longer the case for
general ˜ Fλ. Here I focus on punishment strategies that use the MPE for simplicity.
24Therefore, the main thrust of the analysis remains the same when the assumption of ˜ Fλ =
˜ F∗
λ is relaxed. There is nevertheless an important diﬀerence between this proposition and
Proposition 4; this proposition no longer states that the consensually-strong state tax rate is
below the MPE tax rate. In fact, a simple example shows that this is no longer true. Take the
case where λ →∞ ; the analysis in Section 3 shows that in the MPE τ∗ → 0 and A[τ∗] → 0,
a very undesirable outcome from the point of view of the citizens. In contrast, with the
consensually-strong state, the equilibrium tax rate always satisﬁes ˜ τ>0 (as long as α>0).31
This result is of considerable interest for the interpretation of an otherwise puzzling feature;
OECD governments typically tax at higher rates than the governments of many less-developed
countries.32 This analysis shows that this need not be because governments are “politically
stronger” in these more developed polities. Instead, it might be the outcome of a consensually-
strong state equilibrium where politically weak governments are allowed to impose high taxes
as long as a suﬃcient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods. Interestingly, the
analysis also highlights that even in the consensually-strong state equilibrium, the delivery of
public goods comes with signiﬁcant rents for the ruler; the incentive compatibility constraint
necessitates that, despite its political weakness, the ruler receive suﬃcient rents so that he
is not tempted to use the tax revenues for his own beneﬁt. Therefore, the image of OECD-
type governments that emerges from this model is one of politically weak, but economically
strong states that are allowed to impose high taxes with the (credible) promise of delivering
public services. Naturally, what makes this whole equilibrium possible is suﬃcient rents for
the politicians.
5C o n c l u s i o n
While a large body of work in economics highlights the beneﬁts of “limited government,” many
political scientists view “weak states,” which lack the capacity to raise suﬃcient revenues or
regulate the economy, as the culprit in the disappointing economic performance of many less
developed nations. This paper constructs a simple model where both weak and strong states
create distortions. The costs of strong states are familiar in the political economy literature; the
absence of checks on the redistributive power of the ruler or the political elites controlling the
state apparatus creates an environment where citizens’ investment and eﬀort are discouraged.
The cost of weak states are also related to the incentives of those in power; if the state is
excessively weak, meaning that it is unable to capture a suﬃcient fraction of the society’s
31The reason why this result did not emerge in Section 4.1 is simple: when ˜ Fλ = ˜ F
∗
λ, the MPE tax rate takes
the highest possible value, τ = δ.
32This discussion does not necessarily suggest that we should think of the Markov equilibrium concept applying
to less-developed countries, while the subgame perfect equilibrium concept applies to OECD countries. Instead,
there are various circumstances in which the subgame perfect equilibrium will be similar to the MPE. These
include low rates of discounting for rulers, low values of δ (leading to excessively weak states), or very low values
of λ (implying that there are no political controls on rulers).
25resources, those controlling the state will have little incentive to undertake their side of the
investments, for example in public goods, in infrastructure or in law enforcement. A balanced
distribution of power between state and society is therefore necessary to encourage investments
both by the citizens and those controlling the state apparatus.
In the model economy of the paper, the exit options of citizens (e.g., production in the
informal sector) place constraints on the taxes that the government can impose. When these
exit options are low, the state is economically strong, and citizens face excessively high tax rates
stiﬂing investment and eﬀort. When they are high, the state is weak, and the political elites,
anticipating only limited future beneﬁts, do not undertake the necessary investments to raise
the productive capacity of the economy. The “optimal” strength of the state from a second-
best viewpoint depends on whether citizens’ or the state’s investments are more important
for economic development (though there is no presumption that the actual strength of the
state, determined by other political economy considerations, will come close to this optimal
strength).
While a formulation where the state’s strength is parameterized by its ability to raise taxes
is tractable, in practice the strength of the state depends on the political constraints placed on
it by various groups in society. The second part of the paper analyzes the trade-oﬀ between
politically weak and strong states. Citizens can replace the ruler when he pursues policies
that are not in their interest. When the state is politically weak, it cannot impose high taxes,
and anticipating this, the ruler invests little in public goods. Consequently, the same trade-oﬀ
between economically weak and strong states also arises between politically weak and strong
states.
The contrast between weak and strong states highlighted by these models does not, however,
provide us with a framework for thinking about the role of the state in many OECD nations
where the state appears politically weak (in the sense that political elites can be replaced
easily), imposes high taxes, but then invests a high fraction of the revenues in public goods. In
the last part of the paper, I show how an equilibrium of this sort, which I dub the “consensually-
strong state” equilibrium, can emerge when citizens accept high taxes as long as there is a
credible promise that a suﬃcient fraction of these will be invested in public goods. This
equilibrium is made possible by the fact that the state is politically weak, so the elites can be
replaced easily if the ruler deviates from the prescribed behavior.
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to develop a framework for understanding the trade-oﬀs
created by weak and strong states. As such, it abstracts from many important aspects of the
question at hand. The most important omission relates to the sources of the constraints on
states’ power; the strength of the state in many less developed nations is not limited by the
power of the citizens, but by some other privileged social group, such as tribal chiefs, various
strongmen or sometimes groups of wealthy landowners. The costs and beneﬁts of weak states
26in societies where there are multiple cleavages, for example, between the state and society
and/or between rich and poor agents within the society remains an area for future research.
Another important area for future study is an empirical investigation of trade-oﬀs between
weak and strong states, and whether there are certain types of societies, for example those at
the earlier stages of development, where weak states are more costly for economic prosperity.
276 Appendix A: Proofs
First-Order Conditions in Section 4.1: Let us denote the Lagrangian function by L






































(1 − ˜ τ)
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(1 − ˜ τ)
1−2α
α ˜ τ) ˜ A +
1 − λ
α
(1 − ˜ τ)
1−2α
α δ ˜ A
¸
≥ 0 and ˜ τ ≤ δ,
with complementary slackness. Finally,
∂L
∂µV =
(1 − ˜ τ)
1−α
α ˜ τ ˜ A








(1 − λ)(1 − ˜ τ)
1−α
α δ ˜ A
1 − α
−
β(1 − λ)2(φ − 1)(1 − δ)
1−α
α δA[δ | λ]
(1 − β(1 − λ))φ(1 − α)
=0 .
Combining (40) and (41) gives (37), while (42) gives (36).
Proof of Proposition 4: The objective function is continuous. In addition, from (37),
0 ≤ ˜ A ≤ Amax ≡ ((1 − (1 − β)(1− λ)δ))
1/(φ−1),s o
³
˜ τ, ˜ A
´
∈ [0,δ] × [0,Amax].M o r e o v e r ,
(36) and (37) deﬁne a compact non-empty constraint set, so a solution to the maximization
problem, thus an equilibrium, exists.
The comparative static results for the case where ˜ τ<δfollow from equations (37) and
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(1−β(1−λ))(1−α)φ is the second term in the deviation payoﬀ of the








where B1 is the matrix obtained by replacing the ﬁrst column of B by cλ.
|B| = −(1 − β)
−1 α−1 (1 − ˜ τ)
2−3α
α ×
[1 − (1 − λ)(1− β)δ] × [(1 − λ)(1− β)δ − ˜ τ]
−(1 − β)
−1 (1 − ˜ τ)
1−2α
α ˜ Aφ−1 ×
∙
(φ − 1)
α − ˜ τ
1 − α
+( φ − 1)(1 − λ)(1− β)δ − α + α(1 − λ)(1− β)δ
¸
.
Now substituting for ˜ A from (37), this can be written as:
|B| =( 1 − β)
−1 α−1 (1 − ˜ τ)
2−3α
α × [1 − (1 − λ)(1− β)δ] ×
∙
(φ − 1)
α − ˜ τ
1 − α
+( φ − 1)(1 − λ)(1− β)δ − α + α(1 − λ)(1− β)δ +˜ τ − (1 − λ)(1− β)δ
¸
.
=( 1 − β)
−1 α−1 (1 − ˜ τ)
2−3α
α × [1 − (1 − λ)(1− β)δ] ×
∙












Since ˜ τ<δ , Assumption A4 is suﬃcient to ensure that (φ − 1)/(1 − α) > 1,s ot h a t|B| < 0.
|B| < 0 is also equivalent to the second-order condition for a maximum, so Assumption A4 is
also suﬃcient to ensure that the stationary point we characterized is a maximum.
|B1| is more straightforward:
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× [1 − (1 − λ)(1− β)δ]
×
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δ (1 − ˜ τ)
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and ∂ (λ,δ)/∂δ > 0. The same steps immediately imply that |B1| > 0,s od ˜ A/dδ < 0.






(1 − ˜ τ)1/α ˜ A ≥
1
1 − α
(1 − ˜ τ)(1−α)/α (α(1 − ˜ τ)+η˜ τ) ˜ A +
β
1 − α






(1 − δ)(1−α)/α (α(1 − δ)+ληδ)A[δ | λ].
Dividing by ˜ A and multiplying by (1 − α)(1− β),w eh a v e
βα(1 − ˜ τ)1/α ≥ (1 − β)(1− ˜ τ)(1−α)/αη˜ τ + β (1 − β)(1− δ)(1−α)/α (α(1 − δ)+ληδ)




Now using the facts that ˜ τ<δ ,t h a t(1 − ˜ τ)(1−α)/α˜ τ is increasing in ˜ τ for ˜ τ<α ,a n d
A[δ | λ] ≤ ˜ A, and rearranging, we obtain the following suﬃcient condition for (34) to hold:
β2ληδ ≥ (1 − β)ηδ.
This condition is satisﬁed and (34) holds for sure, as long as
β ≥ β∗ ≡
√
1+4 λ − 1
2λ
< 1.
This establishes that β ≥ β∗ is suﬃcient for this form of the equilibrium to exist and for the
comparative static results. QED
Proof that (36) is upward sloping in the
³
˜ τ, ˜ A
´
space: Note that the left-hand
side of (36) is always increasing in ˜ τ and a strictly concave function of ˜ A.M o r e o v e r , i t i s
maximized at ˆ A[˜ τ]=
³
α−1 (1 − ˜ τ)
1−α
α [˜ τ − (1 − λ)(1− β)δ]
´1/(φ−1)
. (37) implies that when
˜ τ<δ , ˜ A =
³
(1 − ˜ τ)
1−α
α [1 − (1 − λ)(1− β)δ]
´1/(φ−1)
.S i n c e ˜ τ<αand (1 − λ)(1− β)δ>
α(1 − λ)(1− β)δ,t h i si m p l i e s[1 − (1 − λ)(1− β)δ] >α −1 [˜ τ − (1 − λ)(1− β)δ], and there-
fore ˜ A> ˆ A[˜ τ]. Since (36) is strictly concave with a unique maximum at ˆ A[˜ τ] and ˜ A> ˆ A[˜ τ],
30it is decreasing in ˜ A (in the neighborhood of the values for ˜ A consistent with (37)), and con-
sequently, (36) traces an upward sloping curve in the
³
˜ τ, ˜ A
´
space.QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :The analysis follows the one for the case where Fλ = F∗
λ.I n
particular, the incentive compatibility constraint for the citizens can be formulated by only
checking their payoﬀ from deviating when θ =0 .T h i si sg i v e nb y
Ud
³





(1 − ˜ τ)(1−α)/α (α(1 − ˜ τ)+η˜ τ) ˜ A + (43)
β
1 − α










¯ τ( ˜ A)
´´
¯ τ( ˜ A)η
´
˜ A − λ
Z T(¯ τ( ˜ A))
0






(1 − ¯ τ)
1−α
α (α(1 − ¯ τ)+λF (T (¯ τ))¯ τη)A[¯ τ] − λ
Z T (¯ τ)
0
θA[¯ τ]dF (θ),
where ¯ τ (A) denotes the best response of a ruler after a deviation by the citizens when public
goods are equal to A, and the integral terms incorporate the expected cost of replacing the
ruler.
Let us ﬁrst ignore this incentive compatibility constraint. Then the ﬁrst-order conditions
for the new maximization problem are similar to (40), (41) and (42). Since ˆ τ( ˜ A) is chosen
optimally for the ruler from (39), we can use the envelope theorem to simplify the eﬀect of ˜ A
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³
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α ˆ τ( ˜ A) ˜ A
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⎦ ≥ 0
and ˜ τ ≤ δ, with complementary slackness. Finally,
∂L
∂µV =
(1 − ˜ τ)
1−α
α ˜ τ ˜ A
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ˆ τ( ˜ A)
´
)(1 − λF (¯ τ))(φ − 1)(1 − ¯ τ)
1−α
α ¯ τA[¯ τ]
(1 − β(1 − λF (¯ τ)))φ(1 − α)
=0 .
With an analysis similar to before, we obtain the following two equations characterizing an
interior solution:
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´
− ˜ Aφ−1 =0 ,
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α ¯ τA[¯ τ]
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where now ¯  (λ,δ) ≡
β(1−λF(ˆ τ( ˜ A)))(1−λF(¯ τ))(φ−1)(1−¯ τ)
1−α
α ¯ τA[¯ τ]
(1−β(1−λF(¯ τ)))φ(1−α) ,s o∂¯  (λ,δ)/∂λ < 0. Applying
Cramer’s rule again gives identical expressions and establishes d ˜ A/dλ > 0. The analysis leading
to d ˜ A/dδ < 0 is identical.
Finally, we also still have limβ→1 Uc
³




˜ τ, ˜ A | ˜ A
´
,t h u sβ∗∗ < 1 exist
such that (34) is slack at the solution.QED
327 Appendix B: Endogenous Size of Government
The analysis in the text related the output and eﬃciency to the distribution of rents between
the state and the citizens (the economic strength of the state) is captured by the parameter δ.
B u tw h a td o e sδ correspond to in reality? Here, I give a brief analysis of the situation where
δ is related to the size of government, and the involvement of the government in the economy.
Suppose that there are [0,1] sectors, and individuals randomly choose which sector to
produce in. The output of all sectors are perfect substitutes, and the production function
is still given by (2). The government can only tax the sectors that it inspects or controls.
Intuitively, if there is no government inspection or government involvement in a particular
sector, citizens can hide their output eﬀectively.
The government chooses which sectors to inspect, with a restriction that one employee can
inspect one sector. So the size of the government will determine δ. In particular, in equilibrium
agents will distribute themselves evenly across sectors and the government will randomize over
which sectors to inspect, so
δ = nt,
where nt is the number of agents hired by the government at time t.33
Since all agents are risk neutral, Propositions 1 and 2 from Section 2 continue to apply.
To simplify the analysis, assume that the size of the government is chosen at the beginning of
every period independently from past sizes of government.
Then the maximization problem of the government can be written as:
V (At)= m a x
nt,At+1
½





t+1 + βV (At+1)
¾
where w(At,nt) is the wage that the government has to pay to agents to convince them to
work in the public sector.
Let us ﬁrst assume that, in this maximization problem, the government treats the wage
w(At,nt) as a constant at ω (or alternatively, the wage is exogenously given at ω). I endogenize
the wage later and compare the optimal value of nt with the result for the constant case.
Since the choice of nt does not aﬀect the choice of At+1,t h eﬁrst-order condition for the











33Notice that there is a very large number of citizens (a continuum of them), so any mixed strategy will lead to
a deterministic allocation of agents across sectors. An allocation in which agents distribute themselves unevenly
across the sectors cannot be an equilibrium, since it would be a best response for the government to inspect the
sectors where there are more agents with a greater probability, making it suboptimal for them to enter these
sectors. This leaves the allocation considered in the text. In principle, if we consider correlated equilibria, there
can be other equilibrium allocations as well, but these would be equivalent to the one considered in the text,
because they would have exactly the same expected tax revenue and the ruler’s utility is linear in revenue.
33Now to make the comparison, suppose that ω = w(At,nc






is the wage that will make individuals indiﬀerent between entering public employment and
working as producers.
















Let us now contrast this to the case where the wage is endogenous, given by (47), and the
dependence of the wage on the level of public employment is recognized by the ruler in his





















Comparing this expression with (48) immediately implies that n∗
t >n c
t: when the endogeneity
of the wage rate is taken into account, there is an additional negative term on the right-
hand side, indicating that the eﬀective cost to the ruler of hiring one more worker into the
public sector is lower, and thus his demand for labor is higher with an endogenous wage.
This is because of a “reverse monopsony” problem. By hiring one more worker, the ruler
is increasing taxes, and this depresses earnings in the private sector. Recognizing this, the
eﬀective cost of hiring one more worker is lower, since it reduces the public wage bill. Of
course, this reverse monopsony problem is ineﬃcient: as the ruler hires more employees, and
taxes increase, investment in the private sector decreases.
We saw in the text section how the level of δ, the “organization of society”, most preferred
by the ruler, δr, is greater than that preferred by a net output maximizing social planner,
δwm, thus loosely speaking ineﬃciently high. The analysis in this Appendix identiﬁes another
potential ineﬃciency that will arise when a self-interested ruler controls the organization of
society, not by directly choosing δ, but by deciding the size of the public sector, which inﬂuences
δ. Because of the reverse monopsony problem, whereby the opportunity cost of hiring more
workers into public employment declines in the size of public employment, the ruler will choose
an even larger level of δ and public employment.
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Figure 1Constraint on the executive is the average constraint on the executive index normalized from 0 to 1 between 1990 and 1999 from Polity IV explained in Marshall and 
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